Two decades ago, before I became a journalist, I used to work as a social anthropologist in the Himalayas. It is undoubtedly an unusual background for a financial journalist. 

    Indeed, whenever I reveal my strange past today, bankers usually either react with horror (what does she know about finance?) or incredulity (why would anyone spend years studying Tajik goat-herders?)

    But a decade later, my years in Tajikistan are suddenly starting to look a whole lot more useful. For one thing that anthropology imparts is a healthy respect for the importance of micro-level incentives and political structures. And right now these issues are becoming critically important for Wall Street and the City, as the credit crunch deepens by the day. 

    Take the matter of risk and remuneration at banks. As my colleague, Martin Wolf, pointed out this week, one reason for the recent excesses of the credit bubble lies in how bankers are paid. For the emphasis on annual bonuses creates crazy incentives for bankers to gamble with client money – particularly since they don't pay back these bonuses if deals later sour.

    However, what is equally interesting is while this bonus system is endemic, it has not produced identical outcomes at the banks. Some (such as JPMorgan and Deutsche) appeared to have ducked the worst of the credit pain, while others (Goldman Sachs) have thrived. However, banks such as Citi, UBS and Merrill are producing mind-boggling losses. 

    Why? Luck, undoubtedly, plays a part. But I suspect at least three other factors might also shed light on the puzzle.

    One is obvious: namely the character of those running banks. In recent years, it has been fashionable in management circles to encourage leaders to delegate. This is a principle Chuck Prince, former head of Citi, for example, appears to have practised (perhaps because there was no alternative, given Citi's gargantuan size). So, famously, did James Cayne at Bear Stearns.

    But one trait most surviving bank leaders share, as one policymaker recently observed to me, is that “they tend to be meddlers – very hands on”. Moreover, many also have another key feature: they have had direct career experience of trading and managing market risk. This has given them an obvious advantage in navigating the credit cycle, since they presumably know what a derivative is.

    Furthermore, men such as Lloyd Blankfein at Goldman Sachs or Anshu Jain at Deutsche, who have risen through trading desks, instinctively tend to view everything in terms of probabilities and risk. That is a different mindset from somebody who has previously worked as a salesman, adviser – or lawyer, such as Mr Prince.

    However, there is a third issue which may be even more important – the culture of power. As far an outsider can tell, Goldman Sachs appears to have retained many of the cultural features of its previous partnership. Employees typically view themselves as being affiliated to the bank, not business line, and there is a strong ethos of shared accountability. As a result, senior Goldman staff appear able to scrutinise the operations of other business units with more freedom than at other banks.

    However, groups such as Citi or Merrill appear to have developed a more hierarchical pattern, in which the different business lines have existed like warring tribes, answerable only to the chief. Moreover, the most profitable tribe has invariably wielded the most power – and thus was untouchable and inscrutable to everyone else. Hence the fact that, in this tribal culture, nobody reined in the excesses of the structured finance teams at Citi and Merrill.

    Now, I fully expect that my e-mail box tomorrow will be full of e-mails from bankers, complaining this three-point account is a gross simplification. No doubt. But what is crystal clear is that if you want to understand which banks will emerge as winners from the current mess, it is no longer enough to look at their computer systems and balance sheets. Now, more than ever, investors need to understand a bank's culture too – and the degree to which it is tribal. As I said, a training in Tajik anthropology is suddenly looking very useful.

    二十年前，当我还没有进入记者行业的时候，我曾经作为一名社会人类学者，在喜马拉雅地区工作过一段时间。对于一名金融记者而言，这无疑是一种与众不同的背景。

    的确，无论我什么时候讲述到那段特别的过往岁月，银行人士通常要么是一幅惊骇表情（她对金融能有什么了解啊？），要么就是一脸的难以置信（怎么还有人想去研究塔吉克牧羊人？）

    但在十年之后，我的塔吉克斯坦经历突然开始变得有用起来了。因为人类学教会我的一件事，就是正确认识微观层面激励和政治架构的重要性。目前，对于华尔街与金融城而言，随着信贷紧缩日益加深，这些问题逐渐变得至关重要。

    以银行的风险与薪酬问题为例。正如我的同事马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)最近所指出的，最近信贷泡沫肆虐的原因之一，就在于银行人士的薪酬方式。对年终奖金的重视极大地刺激了银行人士，鼓励他们用客户的资金进行博弈——尤其是即便这些交易随后出现问题，他们也不必交回奖金。

    然而，同样很有意思的是，虽然这个奖金制度是该行业的通病，但各家银行的命运并不一样。一些银行——如摩根大通(JPMorgan)与德意志银行(Deutsche)——似乎躲过了最严重的信贷危机打击，而高盛(Goldman Sachs)等银行更是繁荣依旧。然而，花旗(Citi)、瑞银(UBS)及美林( Merrill)等银行损失惨重。

    为什么？无疑，这里有运气的成分。但我怀疑，至少还有其它三个因素，会对我们解开这一谜题有所助益。

    其一很明显：那些银行掌门人的性格。近些年，在管理圈中，鼓励领导人放权已经成为时尚。这似乎是花旗前首席执行官查克•普林斯(Chuck Prince)曾经秉持的一个原则（考虑到花旗的巨大规模，这也可能是因为他别无选择）。贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)的詹姆斯•凯恩(James Cayne)也是这样。

    但是，正如一位政策制定者最近对我提到的，多数幸存下来的领导都有着一个显著的特点，那就是：“他们往往是爱管闲事的人——非常事必躬亲”。

    此外，很多人还有着另外一个关键特点：他们在交易及管理市场风险方面都有着直接的工作经验。这赋予了他们一个明显的优势，以度过这次信贷周期，因为他们应该知道衍生品是一个什么东西。

    此外，高盛的劳埃德•布兰克费恩(Lloyd Blankfein)及德意志银行的安苏•贾殷(Anshu Jain)等人都是从交易部门晋升上来的，他们本能地会从概率与风险的角度看待一切事物。和那些曾是销售、顾问或是律师（如普林斯）的领导相比，他们的思维方式是完全不同的。

    但是，还有第三个因素，甚至可能比上述因素更重要——权力文化。连局外人都看得出来，高盛显然保留了从前合伙制的很多文化特征。雇员通常将自己看成是企业的伙伴，而不是公司挣钱的机器，而且，这里有一种很强烈的责任共担风气。因而，与其它银行相比，高盛的高层员工在审视其它业务部门的运作方面似乎有着更多的自由。

    然而，花旗或美林等其它集团似乎发展了一种等级更为分明的制度，不同业务分支仿佛像是正在交战的部落，只服从最高首领一个人。而且，获利最为丰厚的部落总是持有最大的权力——因而谁也不能碰，也不受他人检查。因此，在这样一个部落文化中，没有人去控制花旗与美林结构性金融部门的肆无忌惮。

    现在，我完全可以想像，我的电子邮箱明天将会挤满来自银行人士的电邮，抱怨这三点将问题过于简单化了。这是毫无疑问的。但是，有一点很明显，如果你想要判断哪个银行将从目前混乱的局面中胜出，仅仅了解银行的计算机系统与资产负债状况已经不够了。现在，投资者比以往任何时候都更需要理解一家银行的文化，以及它在多大程度上是一个部落。如我所言，在塔吉克斯坦人类学方面的知识突然变得非常有用了。