So far, the international economic consequences of the war in the Caucasus have been fairly minor, despite Georgia's role as a major corridor for oil shipments. But as I was reading the latest bad news, I found myself wondering whether this war is an omen - a sign that the second great age of globalization may share the fate of the first.

    If you're wondering what I'm talking about, here's what you need to know: our grandfathers lived in a world of largely self-sufficient, inward-looking national economies - but our great-great grandfathers lived, as we do, in a world of large-scale international trade and investment, a world destroyed by nationalism.

    Writing in 1919, the great British economist John Maynard Keynes described the world economy as it was on the eve of World War I. "The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth … he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world."

    And Keynes's Londoner "regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement … The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion … appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice."

    But then came three decades of war, revolution, political instability, depression and more war. By the end of World War II, the world was fragmented economically as well as politically. And it took a couple of generations to put it back together.

    So, can things fall apart again? Yes, they can.

    Consider how things have played out in the current food crisis. For years we were told that self-sufficiency was an outmoded concept, and that it was safe to rely on world markets for food supplies. But when the prices of wheat, rice and corn soared, Keynes's "projects and politics" of "restrictions and exclusion" made a comeback: many governments rushed to protect domestic consumers by banning or limiting exports, leaving food-importing countries in dire straits.

    And now comes "militarism and imperialism." By itself, as I said, the war in Georgia isn't that big a deal economically. But it does mark the end of the Pax Americana - the era in which the United States more or less maintained a monopoly on the use of military force. And that raises some real questions about the future of globalization.

    Most obviously, Europe's dependence on Russian energy, especially natural gas, now looks very dangerous - more dangerous, arguably, than its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. After all, Russia has already used gas as a weapon: in 2006, it cut off supplies to Ukraine amid a dispute over prices.

    And if Russia is willing and able to use force to assert control over its self-declared sphere of influence, won't others do the same? Just think about the global economic disruption that would follow if China - which is about to surpass the United States as the world's largest manufacturing nation - were to forcibly assert its claim to Taiwan.

    Some analysts tell us not to worry: global economic integration itself protects us against war, they argue, because successful trading economies won't risk their prosperity by engaging in military adventurism. But this, too, raises unpleasant historical memories.

    Shortly before World War I another British author, Norman Angell, published a famous book titled "The Great Illusion," in which he argued that war had become obsolete, that in the modern industrial era even military victors lose far more than they gain. He was right - but wars kept happening anyway.

    So are the foundations of the second global economy any more solid than those of the first? In some ways, yes. For example, war among the nations of Western Europe really does seem inconceivable now, not so much because of economic ties as because of shared democratic values.

    Much of the world, however, including nations that play a key role in the global economy, doesn't share those values. Most of us have proceeded on the belief that, at least as far as economics goes, this doesn't matter - that we can count on world trade continuing to flow freely simply because it's so profitable. But that's not a safe assumption.

    Angell was right to describe the belief that conquest pays as a great illusion. But the belief that economic rationality always prevents war is an equally great illusion. And today's high degree of global economic interdependence, which can be sustained only if all major governments act sensibly, is more fragile than we imagine.

    尽管格鲁吉亚是石油传输的重要通道，到目前为止，高加索地区战争对国际经济所产生的影响还比较小。但是，当阅读到最近一系列令人不安的新闻时，我陷入思考：这场战争是否是一个先兆？全球化的第二个时代有可能会重蹈它上一个时代的覆辙。

    如果你不清楚我这种说法的依据，那你必须得先了解：我们的父辈生活在基本自给自足、并依靠内部驱动的国民经济世界中；而我们，却生活在一个拥有巨大国际贸易和投资量，并且被民族主义破坏的世界中。

    伟大的英国经济学家约翰凯恩斯在1919年写到，在第一次世界大战临近结束时，世界经济将会是这样的，"伦敦的某个居民能够一边在床上喝着早茶，一边用电话从世界的任何角落预订产品 … 用同样的方法，他同时还可以用自己的财富，在世界任何地方的自然资源和新企业中赌一把。"

    凯恩斯笔下的伦敦人"认为，这样的状态除非更进一步，否则将会是永远正常而且理所当然的 … 军国主义和帝国主义、种族和文化对抗、垄断、管制以及排外所引发的计划和政治 … 似乎对社会和经济生活的一般程序没有任何影响，而国际化几乎到达了全部完成的阶段。"

    然而，此后出现了三十年的战争、革命、政治动荡、萧条和更多的战争。当第二次世界大战结束时，世界经济和政治一片支离破碎，通过之后几代人的努力才将它们重新整合起来。

    所以，现在的事物还会变得支离破碎吗？回答是肯定的。

    让我们来看看目前的粮食危机是如何作用的。多年以来，我们都被告知"自给自足"是一个过时的说法，依赖国际市场获取供应是安全的。然而，当小麦、大米和玉米的价格节节高升时，凯恩斯所说的"管制和排外"的"计划和政治"卷土重来：许多政府急忙通过禁止或者限制出口来保护国内消费者，也使粮食依赖进口的国家陷入困境。

    再来看看"军国主义和帝国主义".正如我之前提到的，格鲁吉亚的战争单独看来，似乎对全球经济没有什么大的影响，但它却标志着"美国统治下的秩序"时代的完结 - 这个时代期间，美国或多或少地垄断了军事武力的使用。这也对全球化的未来提出了诸多真正的问题。

    最明显的是，欧洲对俄罗斯能源，尤其是天然气的依赖，现在看起来是非常危险的 - 可以证明，这种危险程度比它对中东石油的依赖更加严重。毕竟，俄罗斯已经把天然气用作武器，在2006年，他们在与乌克兰发生的天然气价格争端过程中停止了输送。

    另外，如果俄罗斯愿意并且能够使用武力控制其宣称的势力范围，难道其它国家不也会这样做吗？试想，如果快要超过美国成为世界第一大生产国的中国，动用武力宣告收复台湾，后果将会怎样？

    有些分析家劝告我们不用担心，因为世界经济的一体化能够避免战争出现，他们认为，成功的贸易经济体不会冒着失去财富的风险，介入军事冒险主义。但是历史同样在这个问题上也给了我们不愉快的教训。

    第一次世界大战开始前不久，另一位英国作家诺曼安吉尔出版了一本着名的书，名叫"巨大的假象",该书认为战争已经过时，因为在工业化时代，即使获得军事胜利，结果都会是失大于得。他想法似乎有道理，可在此之后战争就没有停止过。

    而第二轮经济全球化的基础是不是比第一次更加牢固？在某些方面，答案是肯定的。例如，西欧国家之间发生战争的可能性简直无法想象，这不是因为它们之间的经济纽带，而是基于共同的民主价值观。

    然而，世界的某些其它地区，包括在全球经济中扮演重要角色的一些国家，并不认同这样的价值观。我们多数人都有着这样的信念，至少在经济领域，将不会有太大的问题，因为利润巨大，全球贸易将继续自由发展。可是，这并不是一个安全的假设。

    安吉尔是正确的，他认为军事胜利能够帮助获取利益是一个巨大的假象。同样的，经济理性总能够避免战争也是一个巨大的假象。今天世界经济的相互依赖程度的脆弱性远远超乎我们的想象，只有主要国家政府采取明智的措施，这种相互依赖才能够得以维持。